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BEYOND CROSBY V. BEAM:1 OHIO COURTS EXTEND PROTECTION
OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The clear trend of legislatures and courts today is to provide remedies for oppressed
minority stockholders of closely held corporations. In some Ohio courts, this protection
recently has reached a new heighL Ohio courts currently view working minority share-
holders of close corporations as employees of the corporation, rather than employers.'
However, as employees, they are not subject to the harsh results of the often unyielding
employment-at-will docuine of Ohio. Rather, these courts are protecting the minority
sharelders by finding an implied employment conirta with the majority shareholder.'
This Comment explores the possible ramifications of viewing working minority
shareholders as term employees on both close corporation law and at-will-employment
law in Ohio. Part I discusses the background and emergence of the heightened fiduciary
duty owed by the majority stockholders to the minority stockholders in closely held
corporations and the resultant protection of the minority. Part 11 discusses the current
standing of the employment at-will doctrine and what protections exist for at-will em-
ployees in Ohio. Part I examines recent Ohio case law that compares close corporation
employment with at-will-employment and analyzes the courts' reasoning behind creat-
ing a new exception to at-will-employment This section also discusses the necessity of
using the reasonable expectations testto determine the implied terms ofany employment
contract binding on the shareholders. Finally, this Comment concludes by arguing that
this new judicial standard will provide further needed fairness, predictability and con-
sistency otherwise lacking under Ohio's optional close corporation statute.
1548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989).
2See F HODGE O'NEAL & ROBErT B. THOMPSON, O'NALs CLOSE CoRPORATIONS C3d ed. 1988) [hereinaftr
O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS]; F. HODGE ONEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, ONEAL'S OP-
PRESSION OF MmNosrY S&.EUMOLERS (2d ed. 1985) [hereinAfter ONEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF
MINORIrY SHAREHOLDERS]; E HodgeO'Neal Oppression ofMinoriy Shareholders: ProtectingMinority Rights,
35QBV. Sr. L REv. 121 (1986); Brem Nidholsam, The FiduciaryDuty of Clos Corporation Shareholders: A Cal
forLesixion.30A& BUS. LI. 513 (992)
'Gia v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644,650 (Ohio CL App. 1992) (finding "that parme in a close corpor... are
employees"). See ah'o Wdighsel v. Ross-Co Redi-Mix, Inc., No. 1791,1993 WL 97780, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 4dh
Dist Mar 26, 1993) (refering to a minority shareholder of a close corporation as "an employee/shareholderz).
'See Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 648 (disusing factors relevant to Gigax's employment whidh creat implied-in-fac term
employmem) Wrishtsel, 1993 WL 97780 at *5-6 (compuing dose corporations to partnerships which demand
mutual amt and disomure). Busee Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E.2d 573,576 (Ohio CL App.) (refsing to find any
employment cdition for wodang minority shareholders excrt at-will-employment),jurisdictional motion over-
rida, 619 N.E.2d 1028 (Ohio 1993).
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. DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE CORPORATION FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. A Need to Protect the Minority Shareholder
Close corporations are defined by their major attributes. lypically, a close corpo-
ration has few stockholders; shares ae not publicly traded and are not normally traded
at all.5 The classic examples of close corporations include the incorporated family
business and the corporation, limited in scope and investment capital, which is operated
like apannership In close corporations, the shareholders usually ae active participants
in the management of the business." Generally, the operation of close corporations
follows corporation law which enables the majority shareholders to control the corpo-
ration. The majority shareholders elect the directors, usually electing themselves and
their relatives to the board.9
Close corporation shareholders have no established market for their shares because
closely held stock is not normally traded on the public securities market.'0 As a result,
the shareholders often have difficulty withdrawing their investment. Without a ready
market for stock in close corporations, the original shareholder often may sell only at a
great loss.11
These distinguishing characteristics of the closely held corporation combine to
place the minority shareholder of such a business organization in an extremely precari-
ous position.1 2 Minority shareholders in close corporations are vulnerable to "squeeze-
'Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217,220 (Ohio 1989); Estate o (dSroerv. Snamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975,978
(Ohio CL App. 1984). Examples of public markets for stock are the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange.
O'NFAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2, § 1-02.
7 See Wlkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.. 353 N.E.2d 657,662 (Mass. 1976).
' See Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220.
'O'NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESON OF MINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, § 1.02 at 3. See also Carlos
L Israels, The SacredCow of Corporate Existence: Problems of DeadlockandDibsolution, 19 U. CHI L REV. 778,
778-79 (1952) (defining a close corporation early on as the "corporate entity typically organized by an individual,
or a group of individuals, seeking the recognized advantages of incorporation...but regarding themselves basically
as partners and seeking veto powers as among themselves much mom akin to the partnership relation then to the
statutory scheme of representative corpote government").
oCrosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220.
"See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). As distinguished from publicly held
corporations where the stock is owned by numnerous shareholders who act as passive investors, uninvolved in the day-
to-day operation of the coporation. See O'NEAL&THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2, § 1:07 at 24.
Shareholders in a public corporation typically are only interested in the cost of their investment in shares, which are
highly liquid and are not tied to their salary or other employment benefits. Id. A distinguishing characteristic of
shareholders in aclosely held corporation is their reliance on wages received from the corporation. Id.
'ProfessorF. HodgeO'Neal considers the abuse of minority shareholders in closely held corporations by the majority
shareholders to be so widespread today as to create a "national business scandal." O'Neal, supra noet 2, at 121.
[Vol. 27:3,4
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out" tactics by the majority. 3 By applying traditional corporate law to a close corpora-
tion, the majority may squeeze out a minority shareholderin a variety of ways. The most
commonmethodsofmajo ritysqueeze-outsin cludeterminationofa ino rityshareholder's
employment, withholding of dividends, preventing minority shareholders from partici-
pating in company management, and voting excessive salaries for the majority share-
holders.1 4
Under general corporation law, a corporation functions by majority rule.'s As a
result, courts have been reluctant to interfere in the internal functioning of a corporation,
even when there was clear evidence of oppression of the minority by the majority. 16 The
court's deference to majority rule is strengthened by the business judgment rle.17 To-
gether, the principles of majority rule and the business judgment rule act as barriers to
judicial intervention for the protection of oppressed minority shareholders.'8
More recently, courts have protected the easily abused position of the minority
shareholders in closely held corporations by imposing a partnership-type "heightened
fiduciary duty" among all shareholders of a close corporation." In Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., this enhanced fiduciary duty was tempered when the Massachu-
uld. at 125. See alo Estate of Schroerv. Stamo Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975,978-79 (Ohio CL App. 1984) (citing
F. HODGEO'NEAL,"SQUEEZE-OUS OFMINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS
ASSOaATES (1975)).
USee Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220. See also Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Sharrholders'Reason-
able Expectations, 66 WASI. U. LQ. 193, 194-99 (1988) (discussing risks involved for minority shareholders
resulting from traditional corporate norms, and recent legislative and judicial responses to oppression by the major-
ity) Arthur D. Spratlin, Jr., Comment, Modern Remediesfor Oppression in the Closely Held Corporation, 60 MISS.
LJ. 405,408 (1990) (discussing the different expectations of stockholders in public and dose corporations).
I O'NPAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, stpra note 2, § 1-02 at 3. Statutory
modifications to majority rule in some states require a super-majority, such as a two-thirds majority, to adopt changes
or additions to the corporation by-laws. Id. at 3-4.
" See Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the
Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L REV. 1.38 (1982).
"See Thompson, supra note 14, at 195 (defining the business judgment rule as the broad discretion courts give to the
business decisions of a corporation's board of directors).
"See id. at 236 (concluding that "[tlhe traditional corporate norms of centralized control, majority rule and a
presumption of the corporation's permanence" subject minority shareholders to potential abuse). See also Darsyl
Kates. Note, Deriitive v. Individual Actions in a Close Corporation Context: Crosby V. Bean, 47 Ohio St. 3d 105,
548 N.E. 2d 217 (1989). 59 U. CIN. L REV. 643,646 (1990) (discussing the unique challenge presented by close
corporations to the business judgment rule); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule
in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L REV. 456,459 (1985).
0 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (holding that the stockholders of a close
corporation owe each otherthe same heightened fiduciary duty demanded in a panership). The Massaduset court
went on to find the fiduciary standard required among shareholders of close corporations to be szricter than that
demanded of directors and shareholders of public corporations. Id. at 515-16. To the Donahue court, this meant that
close corporation shareholders had to treat each other with the "utmost good faith and loyalty," and "[tihey may not
act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to
the corporation." Id. at 515.
-353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
Winter/Spring, 1994]
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setts court allowed the majority shareholder an opportunity to demonstrate a legitimate
business purpose for his actions.21 However, if the complaining minority shareholder
then successfully met his burden by demonstrating that this business purpose could be
achieved by less harmful actions, the court would still find the majority in breach of his
fiduciary duty to the minority.I Many courts now follow this enhanced fiduciary duty
standard indeterminingclosecorporationdisputes.3 But, as in WiLkes, the fiduciary duty
owed is generally limited by judicial evaluation of the intent and wrongdoing of the
majority in terms of specific harms directed at the minority shareholder.'
B. Ohio's Close Corporation Statute
Ohio's close corporation law is Section 1701-591 of the Ohio Revised Code.' The
statute's two principal functions are, first, to allow an informal operation of the internal
affairs of a close corporation and, second, to establish a legal relationship among the
shareholders that is essentially the same as that provided partners by partnership law.'
The pnvisions of the statute are not self-executing, but rather are a set of optional rules
1 Id. at 663. The Massachusetts cot demonsuated their concern for the possible broad sweep of the Donahue
decision by stating:
Nevertheless, we are concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith standard
enunciated inDonahue to cases such as the one before us will result in the imposition of imitaticns
on legitimate action by the contralling group in a close corprton which will unduly hamper its
effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interst of all concerned.
Id.
2id. The Massachusetts court demonstrated their concern for the majority's legitimate right to manage the corpo-
Mion by implementing this balancing between the minority and majority interests. See id.
"See, eg., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618
(Fla. Dit. C. App. 1981); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (UL App. Ct. 1990); Warthan v. Midwest ConsoL
Ins Agencies, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. C. App. 1990, Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1989); Crosby
v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989). For examples of courts unwilling toimpose such a high standard of fiuday
duty on majority stockholders in close corporations see Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977), Johns v.
CaldwelL 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tena. CL App. 1980).
24The courts evaluate wheher the majority is acting for personal advantage and not to further the interests of the
corporation, as well as whether the majority is benefiting from advantages notmade equally available to theminority.
See O'Neal, supra note 2, at 142 (noting "the courts are focasing on the impact on shareholders of acts by those in
control of the corpomion, rather than using the traditional approach of searching for misconduct by those in con-
tmoL'
Fora related view, compare Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death ofFiduciayDuty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA.
L REV. 1675 (1990). Mitchell suggests that such limitaLions on the strict fiduciary duty doctrine completely
transforms the doctrine by shifting the foas "from the classic fiduciary eamination of whether the action taken was
in the beneficiary's best interests to a mode of analysis that centers on the fiduciary's interest." Id. at 1708.
-OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.591 (Baldwin 1992).
-See id. § 1701.591(C). Section (C) contains eleven optional methods to simplify the structure and operation of a
close corporation. Id. They range in scope from eliminating the board of directors to authorizing continuing
employment of officers and employees without any limits on duration. Id. § 1701.591 (CX6), (8). The end result is
a companythat functions as apartnershipblt with thelimited liability benefits ofa corporaion. See id.§ 1701.591(C).
[Vol. 27:3,4
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available to establish a "close corporation agreement".27 Through the close corporation
agreement, shareholders of a closely held corporation may design their own corporate
stnucture, with assurance by the statute that their agreement will be given necessary
legitimacy and weight in future dealings and possible conflicts.28 The protections of
Ohio's close corporation agreement are available to any Ohio corporation whose shares
are not listed on a national securities exchange or are not regularly quoted in an over-the-
counter market. The number of shareholders allowed to participate in a close corpo-
ration agreement is not limited by section 1701.591.3D
It is important to note that, because section 1701.591 is optional, any corporation,
regardless of size or structure, not choosing to avail itselfofthe statute's provisions, may
be held to Ohio's general corporation law.3 Without judicial interference, minority
shareholders of close corporations lacking the agreement available through section
1701.591 are open to shareholder oppression by the majority32
Ohio's general corporation law curretly sets forth no provision for judicial disso-
lution resulting from shareholder oppression.33 This void further increases the reliance
placed upon Ohio's courts for protection of minority shareholders of close corpora-
tions.34
C. Judicial Protection for Minority Shareholders in Ohio
In 1989, the Ohio Supreme Court fully embraced the findings of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Donahue and Wilkes. 5 In Crosby v. Beam,n 3 the Ohio court accepted
the analogy of close corporations to partnerships, demanding a heightened fiduciary
"Id. § 1701.591(A) (requirnerent of a close corporation agreement). See also Robert A. Kessler, The ABA Close
Corporation Slatute, 36 MERCER L REV. 661,697 (1985) (describing enabling legislation as providing an option
to shareholders to take action to adopt rules of conduct; self-eecsuting legislation, on the other hand, imposes
automatic rules of conduct without any action by the shareholders.)
"See id. § 1701.591(A), (C). But see id. § 1701.591() (setting forth conditions under which agreement becomes
invalid.)
-id. § 1701.591(I).
"See id. § 1701.591(A) (setting forth requirements for dose corporation agreement). Although this extends the
provisions of § 1701.591 to corporations with large numbers of shareholders, § 1701.519(AX1) requires unanimous
assent for the agreement to qualify. This requirement will realistically work to limit the availability of § 1701.519
to corporations with largenunbers of shareholders. Se-also Forrest B. Weinberg, The Close Corporation Under Ohio
Law, 35 CLEV. ST. L REV. 165, 182 (1987).
3 S~ee O'NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESON OF MNORITY SHAREHOLDERS, smpra note 2. § 1.02.
uSee ifra pu L C. and accompanying notes.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Baldwin 1992). This section's only ground for dissolution relating to share-
holder disputes is a deadlock on the part of the directors in the management of corporate affairs or on the par of
shareholders in the election of directors. Id. at (AX4).
"See infra part IIL A. and accompanying notes.
"See supra part L A. and accompanying notes.
-548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989).
Winter/Spring, 19941
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duty between majority and minority shareholders in close corporations. 37 The court
further explained that the majority or controlling shareholders breach their heightened
fiduciary duty when they benefit from advantages not made equally available to the
minority.1 The majority shareholders may not use their control over the corporation to
advance their own interests, or to provide benefits only to themselves and not to the
minority shareholders.39 However, the Crosby decision did permit the majority share-
holders to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose to uphold their actions ° Once the
minority shareholder demonstrates a lack of an equal opportunity to benefit from the
corporation, the burden shifts to the majority to demonstrate a legitimate business pur-
pose for their actions4 The Crosby court also concluded where a breach of fiduciary
duty to minority shareholder occurs in a close corporation, such a breach gives rise to an
individual, not derivative, cause of action.42
II. CURRENT STANDING OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN OHIO
Since the Industrial Revolution, the employer-employee relations in the United
States have been governed by the at-will employment doctrine43 Where the employ-
ment relation is of indefinite duration, this conventional doctrine enables the employee
to freely quit for any reason at any time, and enables the employer to freely discharge
the employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at any time." The employment-
"Id. at 220 (citing the partnership standard in Donahue of the fiduciary duty as the "utmost good faith and loyalty.").
3 1d. at 220-21. Cases cited by the Ohio Supreme Court as support include Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d
270,276 (Alaska 1980) (the majority breaches theirfiduciary duty when they use their control of the stock to acquire
benefits for themselves which are not shared by the minority); Tillis v. United Pans, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist.
CL App. 1981); Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486N.E.2d70 (Mass. 1985); Donahuev. Rodd Electrotype
Co., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975) (When a corportion purchases shares of stock from a controlling
stockholder, the corporation must".., offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his
shares to the corporation at an identical price."); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio CL
App. 1984); Soulas v. Troy Donut Univ., Inc., 460 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio CL App. 1983); North v. Wick, 144 N.E.2d 132
(Ohio CL App. 1957); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d at 220-21.
"Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221.
'Old. (discussing Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)).
41See Spratlin, supra note 14, at 414 (explaining the shift in burden in the balancing test used by the Wilkes court to
determine whether the minority or majority's interest should prevail).
"Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221. The cot pointed out that requiring a derivative action would produce the irrational
result that any recvery from a derivative suit would go to the corporation, thereby benefitting the principal wrong-
doers, the majority shareholders Id.
IFor a brief historical backgroutd of the at-will-doctrine in the United States, see Frank J. Cavico, FmploymentAt
Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L REV. 497,498-501 (1992); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employ-
mental Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LOAL HISr. 118, 122-29 (1976).
"See Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150,153 (Ohio 1985); see also Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.,
491 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ohio 1986). In Bascom v. Shiulito, the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrated early on a
reluctance tofollow the English rle ofterm employment forone yearpresumed from themerefacta servanthad been
hired. Basccn v. Shillito, 37 Ohio SL 431,433 (1882).
[Vol. 27:3,4
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at-will doctrine even allows discharge of an employee for morally wrong causes indica-
tive of an employer's bad faith, without making the employer guilty of any legal wrong.'-5
Congress' first limitations on the employment-at-will doctrine severely restrict
employee discharges yet today. Both the National Labor Relations Act of 19351 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 were remedial legislation designed to protect
employees within certain classes. Despite the far-reaching effects of these statutes, there
are many employees who currently are at-will-employees.
Although the at-will-employment doctrine seems under constant attack in law re-
view ariticles,-1 Ohio courts stubbornly adhere to its often harsh tenets51 In recent years,
Ohio courts have carved out only two narrow exceptions to the at-will- employment
doctrine. An employee in Ohio may not be discharged in violation of a public policy 2
or when an employment contract is derived from implied contract and promissory
estoppeL53
A. The Public Policy Exception in Ohio
The most widely accepted exception to at-will-employment is the public policy
exception.' When an employee is discharged in contravention of a clearly defined and
45 Fawcen v. G. C. Murphy & Co., 348 N.E.2d 144,147 (Ohio 1976) (finding employers' rights to terminate at-will-
employees is not "limited by principles which protect persons from gross or reckless disregard of their rights and
interests, willful, wanton or malicious acts or acts done intentionally, with insult, or in bad faith.").
"See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHL L REV. 947,947 (1984).
7 Act f July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
"Pub. L No. 88-352,78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)).
"Todd M. Smith, Note, Wmngful Discharge Reexamined: The Crisis Matures, Ohio Responds, 41 CASE W. RES.
L REV. 1209, 1214 (1991).
"See, e g., John D. Blackburn, Restrited EmployerDischargeRights: A Changing Concept of Employmen at Will,
17AM. BUS. L.J. 467,491-92 (1980); Lawrence E. Blades,Fnployment at Will vs.IndiyidualFreedo-n OnLiniting
the Abusive Eercise of FnsplyerPower, 67 COLUM. L REV. 1404,1405-06,1413-14 (1967); Cavicosupra note
43, at 532-46; Gary E. Murg & Clifford Schannan, Eaployment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?,
23 B.C. L REV. 329,338-40, 383-84 (1982)X Cornelius I. Peck, Unust DischargesfromFEmployment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OIo ST. L. 1,1-10 (1979); Theodore L St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge
Reform Heads TowardFull Flower, 67 NEB L REV. 56, 65-70, 81 (1988);, Clyde W. Summers,IndividualProtection
Against Unjust Dismissal: une fora Statute, 62 VA. L REV. 481,484,532 (1976); Smith, supra note 49, at 1262-
69, Note, Protecting Employees at Wil Against Wrongfid Discharge: The Public Policy Erception, 96 HARV. L REV.
1931, 1931-35 (1983).
" Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 451 N.E.2d 1236,1239 (Ohio C2. App. 1982); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co,, 483
N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ohio 1985).
-Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981,986 (Ohio 1990) (holding "that public
policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for
a reason which is prohibited by statute.").
"Mers, 483 N.E.2d at 154.
s'Greely, 551 N.E.2d at 986 & n.3. Including Ohio, thirty-nine states currently recognize this exception. Id.
WinterSpring, 19941
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fundamental public policy, the employer may be held legally accountable.0 The ratio-
nalebehind thepublic policyexceptioninvolvespmtecionof the employee's, employer's,
and society's interests.m While the employee is interested in some degree of job security
and the employer is interested in the efficient and profitable running of her business,
society demands a stable job market premised on fundamental public policies.!
Alower court in Ohio first recognized the public policy exception inPhung v. Waste
Management, Inc.' Although the lower courts in Sandusky County carved out the first
cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge as against public policy, the Ohio Su-
preme Court refused to recognize a public policy exception to at-wil-employment-Y'
The court found that Phung's allegations against his employer" .. . failed to state a
violation of a sufficiently clear public policy to wan-ant creation of a cause of action in
favor of Phung."' The court required a specific statutory violation by the employer to
trigger the public policy exception to at-will-employment.Y The court was comfortable
in deferring to the legislature on this basis because the Ohio Constitution delegates the
primary responsibility of protecting employee welfare to the legislature. 63
In response to the court's inaction and apparent refusal to move beyond the prom-
issory estoppel exception," the Ohio legislature passed a whistleblower's protection
act' The statute provides such remedies for retaliatory dismissal as reinstatement, back
"See Smith, supra note 49, at 1218-19. The author lists "public policy excepions... [as] where employers have
discharged employees for refusing to commit a crime, serving on ajury, 'blowing the whistle' on employee wrong-
doing, filing a workers' compensation claim, and refusing to violate a code of ethics." Id. at 1218 (citations omitted).
'See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,551 (N.H. 1974). The New Hampshire Supreme Court holds "b
all employment contracts, whether at will or for definite term, the employer's interest in runing his business as he
sees fit must be balanced against theinterest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest
in maintaining a proper balance of the two." Id.
-See Joseph R. Grodin, Pass, Present, and Future in Wrongfid Termiwaion Law, 6 LAB. LAW. 97,97-98,103-06,
(1990).
"No. S-84-4, 1984 WL 14394 (Ohio CL App. 6th Dist. Oct. 19, 1984), rev'd, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
"Id. at *7.
IPhung v. WasteManagement, Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114,1116-17 (Ohio 1986) (holding"... Obiohas notyet recognized
any public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. We do not believe that public policy considerations
warrant an exception being made in the case sub judice, nor do they create a cause of action sounding in tort against
the employerfor wrongful discharge."). Phung had been discharged forrepotting to his employer that his toxic waste
disposal facility was operating in violation of the law. Id. at 1115.
1Id. at 1116-17.
aId.
'See id. at 1117. The court went on to cte specific legislative action against retaliatory discharges resulting from
employees filing a workers' compensaion claunm Id. (citing OHtO REV. CODEANN. § 4123.90 (Baldwin 1989)). ne
court also indicated that a violation of public policy would exist in the discharge of an employee because of discrimi-
nation. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Baldwin 1990)).
"See anfra part IL B. and accompanying notes.
6 Such statutes prohibit employers from discharging employees whohave reported violations of federal or state law.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51-53 (Baldwin 1991). See also Suart v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 753 F. Supp. 317,
324 (D. Kan. 1990) (elements of"whistleblowing" tort).
[Vol. 27:3,4
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss3/7
PROMCMON OF MNoRMy SOaCHOLMnS
pay, reinstatement of seniority and fringe benefits." However, neitherpunitive nor front
pay damages are available to the discharged employee under Ohio's whistleblower
statute.7
In Greeley v. Miami Maintenance Contractors, Inc.," the Ohio Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.'
The statute violated by the employer provided that:
No employer may use an order to withhold personal earnings... as a basis
for a discharge of, or for any disciplinary action against, an employee, or
as a basis for a refusal to employ a person. The court may fine an employer
who so discharges or takes disciplinary action against an employee, or
refuses to employ a person, not more than five hundred dollars.0
The court found this statute fulfilled the necessary requirement lacking in Phung of
a sufficiently clear exception to the employment-at-will doctrine .7 But the court made
it clear that the public policy exception in Ohio extends only to situations where an
employee is dismissed "for a reason which is prohibited by statute."'
The Greeley court further held that a cause of action for discharge of an employee
in violation of public policy may be brought in tort. 3 This enables employees dismissed
in direct violation of a statute to recover lost wages in back pay and front pay, reinstate-
ment, and possible assessment of punitive damages for the appropriate set of compelling
facts.74
Since Greeley, the Ohio Supreme Court has strictly construed and limited its holding
in that case. In Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.,7 the employee asserted a cause of
action in tort for wrongful termination in retaliation for his public concern for safety
levels in the plant.76 The court found the employee's reliance on Greeley for support
"Olno REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(E) (Baldwin 1991).
0 See id. Frnt pay damages are awarded as compensation for lost future wages between the date of discharge and
reemploymentin a position ofequalor simlar status. Worrell v. MultipressInc., 543 N.E.2d 1277,1283 (Ohio 1989).
-551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990).
6ld. at 986. In Greeley, the employee was discharged as a result of a court order requiring the employer to withhold
child support payments from the employer's wages. Id. at 982.
UOmo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.213(D) (Baldwin 1989).
7 Greeley, 551 N.E.2d at 986.
'Id. (citing Haziet v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., as having a prior similar result when an employer violated O.R.C.
4112.02(A) by terminating an employee for requesting a temporary leave of absence for treatment of his drug
addiction. Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1986)).
"id. at 987.
4See Cavico, supra note 43, at 504-05 and acconpanying notes.
-584 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 1992).
N4 d. at 733.
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misplaced, because Ohio's whistleblower statuteP had not yet been enacted at the time
of Tulloh's dismissaL78 Because Greeley requires a violation of a statutory prohibition
by the employer for the public policy exception to surface,' and because there was no
such statutory violation by Goodyear in their discharge of Tulloh, the Supreme Court
found "no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim."
In Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabili-
ties,81 the Ohio Supreme Court furher limited its Greeley decision. In Provens, the
employee alleged violation of her rights using the Ohio Constitution as her statutory
basis.82 The court found Greeley did not apply to the facts of Provens because in Greeley
"[t]he court limited its holding to a public policy enunciated in a statute, and not the Ohio
Constitution." 3
In interpreting the whistleblower statute, lower courts in Ohio have strictly con-
strued the statute's requirements. In Bear v. Geetronics, Inc.," the Butler County Court
of Appeals disallowed the employee's wrongful termination suit in violation of O.R.C.
4113.51, because the statute expressly requires oral and writtennotification of the super-
visor as to the employer violation at issue.85 Without strict compliance with the statute's
specifications for protection, the court was unwilling to create a public policy for
whistleblowing 3
wOHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51-53 (Baldwin 1991).
75Tuloh, 584 N.E.2d at 733. § 4113.52 was enacted on June 29, 1988, and Tuldi was dismissed in November of
1986. Id.at 730.
"Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractos, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981,986 (Ohio 1990).
TudIoh, 584 N.E.2d at 733. See also Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd., 570 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ohio 1991) (holding §
4113.52 not expressly retroactive and therefore not applicable to employee discharged two months prior to the
statute's enactment).
,1594 N.R2d 959 (Ohio 1992).
Old. at 961.
3
'Id. at 966. The cowrt also found the public school employee in Prowns had adequate legislative and administrative
remedies without involving a private cause of action against the employer, Id. at 965. See also Anderson v. Lorain
County Ttle Co., No. 92CA005448,1993 WL 407949, at *3 (Ohio CL App. 9th Dist. June 23, 1993) (holding statute
violated by employer provided sufficient civil remedy, thereby precluding a separate tort action for wrongful temmi-
nation in violation of public policy).
-614 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio CL App. 1992).
Old. at 806. The employee did not provide written notice. Id.
"Id. at 807 (holding "4113.52 preempts the formation ofapublic-policy exception totheemployme-at-will doctrine
within the specific context of whistleblowing."). See also Haynes v. Zoological Society of Cincinnati, 567 N.E.2d
1048 (Ohio CL C.P., Hamilton Co. 1990) (finding violation of whistleblower statute when employee was demoted
following employee's written and oral notification to her supervison that employer was violating Ohio statute
requiring all employers to provide a safe place to work).
[Vol. 27:3,4
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Lower courts in Ohio have extended the public policy exception to prohibit em-
ployee discharge for missing work due to statutorily required jury duty.' However, in
extending the Greeley decision in this case, the court carefully compared the public
policy provided by the specific statute at issue in Shaffer with that at issue in Greeley.'
Relatively few jurisdictions in the United States recognize a third exception to at-
will-employment, the implied covenant of good faith, and fair dealing." This theory is
premised on the basic contract principle that "[elvery contract imposes upon each party
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."90 In Ohio,
the public policy exception has not been expanded to include a violation of good faith
and fair dealing.91 As stated in Fawcett v. G. C. Murphy & Co.,2 an employer may
terminate an at-will-employee for willful, wanton, malicious reasons, demonstrating
bad faithonbehalf of the employer." Although Greeley modifiedFawcett Ohio courts
currently stand firm in their refusal to demand employers only terminate employees in
good faith.9 5
'See Shafferv. Frotmunner, nc., 566N.E.2d 193 (Ohio C. App. 1990) (finding violatiMon off 2313.18 a sufficiently
similar public policy breach as the statute violated in Greeley). For the statute at issue in Greeley. see supra, notes
63, 65 and accompanying text. The statute at issue in Shaffer provides in pertinent pan:
(A) No employer shall discha ge or threaten to disch ge any permanent employee who is sum-
maned to serve as a juror pursuant to Chapter 2313. of the Revised Code if the employee gives
reasonable notice to the employer of the summons prior to the conmencement of the employee's
service as a juror and if the employee is absent from employment because of the actual jury service.
(B) Whoever violates this section shall be punished as for a contempt of cowt pursuant to Chapter
2705. of the Revised Code.
0HO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.18 (Baldwin 1992).
=Shaffer, 566 N.E.2d at 194-97 (also noting the Greeley court dictum specifically mentioning O..C. 2313.18 as a
statute that would frustrate public policy when violated).
"See Smithsupra note 49,at 1219 (citing Enployment at Will: State Rulings Chart, [Individual EmploymentRights
Manual] 9A Lab. Rel. Rep (BNA) 505:51-52 (Aug. 1989) list of exceptions to employment-at-will by state)). As
few as twelve states recognize this exception. Id. For jurisdictions recognizing this exception, see, eg., Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co, 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980);
Fortme v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 197T7 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549
(N.L 1974)
-RATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONRACrs § 205 (1981).
" See, eg., Edelman v. Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 622 N.E.2d 411,414 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), Ganim v. Brown
Detby, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 982,986 (Ohio C. App. 1990); Sheets v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 588 N.E.2d 271.275 (Ohio
CLApp. 1990); Spoonev. Seaman Corp.,No. CA-413,1990WL 103745,at"3 (OhioCL App. 5th Dist. July 20,1990);
Kuhnv. SL John and WestShore Hosp., 552N.E.2d 240, 242 (OhioCL App. 1989) (noting "tlhe Ohio Supreme Court
has recognized a duty of good faith and fair dealing in Ohioinsurance contract cases, but not in wrongful disdharge
cases brought by t-will-employees.").
-348 N.E.2d 144 (Ohio 1976).
"Id. at 147.
"See Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.. 551 N.E.2d 981,987 (Ohio 1990) (holding -the right
of employers toterminate employmentat wil for'ny cause' no longer includes the discharge ofan employee where
the discharge is in violation of a statute and thereby contravenes public policy.).
"See cases cited supra note 91.
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B. Implied Employment Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in Ohio
A widely accepted exception to employment-at-will results in employer liability
when employers breach their express or implied promises in reference to their termina-
tion policies.96 Ohio courts recognize both forms this exception may take. In the first
instance, implied-in-fact promises not to terminate without cause are derived from
express employer representations concerning the employer's discharge policies, their
personnel practices, and custom and practice within the industry.9 The second variation
of this exception is the unilateral contract theory applied to express promises made in
employee handbooks.9 When an employee begins orcontinues to work with knowledge
of the handbook, courts have found the employee's performance to constitute acceptance
of the employer's unilateral offer of terms and conditions of employment.99 Employ-
ment handbooks are also enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.'
In Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.,10° the Ohio Supreme Court found the doctrine of
promissory estoppel applicable to oral employment-at-will contracts.m In Mers, the
employee was discharged following his arrest for rape, kidnapping, and gross sexual
imposition.03 However, his employer promised to reinstate him if the alleged charges
were resolved in the employee's favor. °0 Eventually, the charges against Mers were
dropped, but Dispatch Printing refused to honor their promise of reinstatement.11 The
Ohio court found conventional promissory estoppel theory applied, thereby reversing
the lower court's grantof summary judgment for the employer." According to the Ohio
Supreme Court, the corecttest fordetermining whether an at-will-employment contract
"See Smith, supra note 49, at 1215 (listing"employerhandbooks,policies,orotherrepresentations totheemployees"
as creating implied-in-fact term employment in thirty-four states).
"Foran explanation ofthis rationale,see generally id. at 1215-18. SeealsoMers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d
150,154 (Ohio 1985) (noting use of "[eimployee handbooks, company policy, and oral representations to limit the
employment-at-wiln right to discharge").
"For an in-depth explanation of this rationale, see Michael A. Qiagares, CommentLimniting the Employment-at-Wdl
Rule: Enforcing Policy ManualPromises Through Unilateral ContractAnalysis, 16 SEoN HALLL REv. 465,477-
89(1986).
"See Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765,775 (Ohio CL App. 1984) (holding that continued performance by
employee was sufficient consideration to render the employer's promises enforceable). See also Pine River State
Bank v. Meuille, 333 N.W.2d622,627 (Minn. 1983) (holding employee manual to bean offerfor a unilateral contract
which is accepted with sufficient consideration when the employee remains on the job).
1w See Jones v. East Center for Community Health, 482 N.E.2d 969,974 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding employer
representations in handbook enforceable under promissory estoppel theory, even though the handbook did not
constitute an enforceable contract); Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 454 N.E.2d 1343,
1347 (Ohio CL App. 1982) (holding that promissory estoppel was applicable to employment contracts).
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has been altered by the employer is "whether the employer should have reasonably
expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee, and, if so, whether the
expected action orforbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee." 7
Recent Ohio decisions have attempted to clarify the holding in Mers. In Kelly v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.,l°u the court found that whether the employee's allegations state
a claim in promissory estoppel is a question of fact.9 However, in raising promissory
estoppel, the employee must evidence "specific promises" that demonstrate more than
"nebulous representations" by the employer.110 As in any promissory estoppel claim, the
reliance must also be detrimental.'1 ' Declining other employment opportunities on the
employer's promise of continued employment may show detrimental reliance, but this
also is ultimately a question of fact for the jury. 12
Numerous Ohio courts have attempted to define the appropriate balance between
oral employment contracts and employee handbooks. First of all, there is a strong
presumption in favor ofat-will-employm ent in Ohio.1 1 3 However, undercertaincircum-
stances, employee handbooks may alter an at-will-employment contract." 4 In addition,
both the employee and the employer must show an intention to alter the employment-
at-willY5 Disclaimers in handbooks have been found by Ohio courts to constitute an
101d. at 155.
1-545 N.E.2d 1244 (Ohio 1989).
10 See id. at 1249-50 (finding summary judgment inappropriate to decide the reasonableness of the employee's
reliance on the employer's representations).
n Bruno v. Struktol Co. of Am., 576 N.E.2d 821,824 (Ohio CL App. 1991); Modareli v. First Fed. Say. and Loan
Assn. of Wooster. No. 2529,1990 WL 77124 at *9 (Ohio CL App. June 6,1990).
" See Cohen v. Messina, 492 N.E.2d 867,872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (setting forth necessary elements of promissory
estoppel: "There must be a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, reliance by the party to whom the promise
is made, the reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable, and the party claiming estoppel must be injured by the
reliance-').
IuSee Millerv. BancOhioNat'l Bank, Nos. 90AP-380, 90AP-551, 1991 WL64907, at *12 (Ohio CL App. 10th Dist.
Apr. 23, 1991) (finding it a question for the jury whether employee's refusal of job offers made by head hunters
because of current job secunty was reasonable or not).
'"See Biskupich v. Wesay ManorNursing Home, 515 N.E. 2d 632,633 (Ohio CLApp. 1986) (citing Phung v. Waste
Management. Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986) as establishing Ohio's unquestionable adherence to at-will-
employment); Stokes v. Worthington Indus., Inc., No. 88AP-583, 1989 WL 71641. at *4 (Ohio CL App. 10th Dist.
June 29, 1989) (quoting Henkel v. Educ. Research Council of Am., 344 N.E. 2d 118, 121-22 (Ohio 1976)).
4 See Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (Ohio CL App. 1984) (holding oral assurances which conflict
with an employment handbook's disclaimers or induce an employee to disregard their significance will negate the
effect of the disclaimers); Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 545 N.E.2d 1244,1249 (Ohio 1989); Miller, 1991 WL
64907. at *5 (noting that the majority of Ohio employment-at-will cases "have held that an employment handbook
or oral promises or assurances can create an implied contract not to discharge except for just cause.").
Is Sowards v. Norbar, Inc,, 605 N.E.2d 468,471 (Ohio CL App. 1992). See aro Wing v. Anchor Media, Lid., 570
N.E.2d 1095,1098 (Ohio 1991); Kames v. Doctors Hosp., 555 N.E2d 280, 282 (Ohio 1990); Uebelacker v. Cincomn
Sys., Inc., 549 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (Ohio CL App. 1988)
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intentnot to be bound to an employment contract otherthan at-will employment.11'6 Also,
progressive disciplinary proceedings laid out and explained in an employee manual may
alter an at-will contact between employer and employee, but only if the employee
demonstrates knowledge of the procedures gained by reading the manual or by learning
of the procedures in some other way.""
IL A NEW EXCEPTION To AT-WILL-EMPLOYMENT IN OHIO
When addressing majority oppression or squeeze-outs of the minority shareholders
in a close corporation, lower courts in Ohio generally apply the holding in Crosby v.
Beam, and require a heightened fiduciary duty from the majority.' However, the
majority may lawfully breach their heightened fiduciary duty by showing some legiti-
mate business purpose for doing so. 1 9 In responding to the common majority squeeze-
out tactic of terminating minority shareholders,'2 Ohio's lower courts also must recon-
cile any protection given the teninated shareholder with Ohio's generally unfailing
employment-at-will doctrine.12 Without legislative guidelines, different lower courts
in Ohio have applied different reasoning and have come to different conclusions regard-
ing minority shareholders and at-will employment.12
"'See Karns, 555 N.E.2d at 280-81. The terminated employee had signed a disclaimer which said,
lunderstand this Handbookisprested forinfonnaional purposes only, and can be changed at any
time by Doctors Hospital with or without notice. I also understand this Handbook is not a contract
expressed or implied between myself and Doctors Hospital. I understand I am an employee at will
and chhermyself or Doctors Hospital can terminate the employment relationship at any time for any
reason.
Id. at 281.
"11Stokes, 1989 WL 71641 at *8 (also finding promissory estoppel inspplicable since, without knowledge of the
handbook, the employee could not have relied upon it to his detriment). But see, Penwell v. Amherst Hosp., 616
N.E.2d 254,257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding employee manual containing progressive disciplinary policy did not
change at-will employment contract when policy did not include all employment performance situations).
"'See, eg., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263,267-70 (6th Cir. 1991); Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E.2d
573,575 (Ohio CL App.),jurisdictionalmotion overruled, 619N.B.2d 1028 (Ohio 1993); Wrightsel v. Ross-CoRedi-
Mix, Inc.,No. 1791, 1993 WL 97780, at *6 (Ohio CL App. 4th Dist. Mar 26,1993); B & W Custom Cabinets, Inc.
v. Worthington, Nos. 59801, 60709,1992 WL 83821, at *8 (Ohio CL App. 8th Dist. Apr. 23,1992); McLaughlin v.
Beeghly, 617 N.E.2d 703,705 (Ohio CL App. 1992); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644.648 (Ohio CL App. 1992);
Isroffv. Westhall Co., No. 15063.1991 WL260204, at *2 (Ohio C. App. 9th Dist. Nov. 27,1991); Lerner &Assoc.,
Inc, v. Vassy, 599 N.E.2d 734,738 (Ohio CL App. 1991).
"'Cmsby v. Beam, 548 N.E. 2d 217,221 (Ohio 1989) (citing Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d
657 (Mass. 1976)).
maSee Thompson, supra note 14, at 197.
m Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 647-48; Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 576. See also supra part 1I. and accompanying notes.
w This result was warned of in 1987 when one commentator proposed an enactment of an oppression relief law for
Ohio. See Weinberg, supra note 30, at 201. See generally Nicholson, spra note 2 (advocating legislation to provide
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A. Recent Ohio Judicial Responses to Minority Shareholder Terminations
In Gigax v. Repka,n 3 a one-third shareholder and working director was terminated
by the other two working shareholders of the corporation.12 The majority alleged the
minority shareholder's work performance had declined to an unacceptable level.2 5 All
three shareholders had invested $70,000 in the corporation since its inception in 1978.6
Although all three of the shareholders earned the same salary, they had no employment
agreementLV Gigax, the terminated minority shareholder, sought injunctive relief pro-
hibiting the majority from terminating his at-will-employment with the close corpora-
tion.In The trial court refused to do so and Gigax appealed. 2'
In its decision, the Second District CourtofAppeals compared Ohio at-will-employ-
ment law with the heightened fiduciary duty required among close corporation share-
holders.' 3D Relying on the partnership analogy to shareholders in a close corporation,
31
the Gigax court found that a minority shareholder was not an at-will employee that could
be discharged at any time, for any reason by the majority. 3 As in a partnership, the
heightened fiduciary duty requires that removal of working shareholders must be based
on a "legitimate business reason.""3 This Ohio court concluded that, by demanding a
legitimate business reason for discharging working minority shareholders, the correct
balance was reached between protecting the minority and protecting the profitable
workings of the corporations. 1 3
Wrightsel v. Ross-Co Redi-Mix, Inc 12 is a classic example of minority oppression
by the majority. In that case, a thirty-year-old, family-owned close corporation ulti-
mately became co-owned by only two brothers in 1978.31 One brother, Charles, owned
- 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio CL App. 1992). An appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed for want of
prosecution. Gigax v. Repka, 612 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio 1993).






'id. Thetrial court was concerned with burdening a corporation with unproductive employees that would adversely
affect the business, thereby damaging all of the shareholdes Id. at 649.
Lm ld. at 647-49.
ul Id. at 649-50 (noting partnership principles as stated by the same appellate court in Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd.,
608 N.E.2d 1166 (Ohio C. App. 1992)).
L'id. at 649.
mid. at 650. In other words, the at-will-employment doctrine does not apply to such employees. Id.
'NId.
mNo. 1791, 1993 WL 97780 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 26,1993).
16d. at * 1.
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61% and the other brother, David, owned 39% of the coiporation.Y' Between 1978 and
1987, Charles experienced various health problems and surgeries which required David
to take on most of the day-to-day operation and responsibility of running the corpora-
tion.1 In March of 1987, David fell ill and missed three days of work. When he
returned to work, his brother fired him.t4 In the ensuing months, David collected
unemployment compensation while Charles replaced him with members of Charles'
immediate family as officers of the corporation, as well as placing his own 61% in a
tUsL 141 David remained a 39% shareholder, but he received only $4,600 from the
corporation in 1987, as compared to earnings in excess of $60,000 in the prior two
years.14 When the corporation refused to buy out David at his price of $450,000, David
unsuccessfully attempted to sell his minority interest to outsiders.143 In September of
1987, the corporation's final buy-out price of $150,000 was ultimately accepted by
David out of financial necessity.1" David then sued the corporation for breach of
fiduciary duty, stating that the corporation terminated him "without notice and without
cause," requesting $450,000 in compensation.'4 The jury awarded David $150,000 and
the corporation appealed. '
In its decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeals cited favorably to the Gigax
decision, finding that minority shareholders of close corporations were not at-will em-
ployees.147 Because minority shareholders depend on their salary for the primary return
on their investments in the corporation, the court held that such shareholder/employees
may not be fired without a legitimate business reason for the discharge.148 The court
upheld the jury's verdict because Charles had not offered any reason, legitimate or








'Oid. at "3. Charles died in 1988 and, interestingly, his estate tax return showed his interest in the corporation worth
$1,145,839. Id.
I" Id. at *4.
141d. at *6. The court also cited to Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976), Crosby
v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989) and B & W Custom Cabinets, Inc. v. Worthington, Nos. 59801,60709, 1992
WL 83821 (Ohio C. App. 8th Dist Apr. 23,1992) for support. 1993 WL 97780 at *4.
" 1993 WL97780 at "4. The opinion reveals no actual money anounts invested by David. See id. However, David
had worked full-time for the corporation since 1966. Id. at * 1.
"rId. at *6. Therefore, the court upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the minority shareholder, David. Id. at * 11.
[Vol. 27:3,4
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In Priebe v. O'Malley,"' a less sympathetic plaintiff generated a different finding as
to the at-will-employment of close corporation shareholders,'5 Priebe was also a work-
ing shareholder and director of a close corporation.1s2 Priebe and the other original
shareholder agreed to add a third and equal shareholder, O'Malley, to their recently
formed corporation in return for O'Malley's pledge of $2 3 ,000 ./s3 Priebe was then
discharged by the other two working shareholders for his alleged decline in sales perfor-
mance and his inability to work well with other employees of the corporation. ' As in
Gigax, none of the shareholders in Priebe had a written employment agreement. The
trial court found for the defendants and Priebe appealed.m
The Ninth District Court ofAppeals held that the majority shareholders owed Priebe
a "heightened fiduciary duty."'" However, because the majority had convinced the
lower court that they had a legitimate business purpose for terminating Priebe, the Ninth
District Court of Appeals would not disturb the lower court's finding in favor of defen-
dants.15
Priebe also appealed the lower court's finding on the grounds that he had an implied
employment contract with the corporation, establishing term employment ratherthan at-
will-employment. 9 The Ninth District disagreed.160 Instead, the court found the
corporation's established work policy "allowing it to 'relieve' any director or share-
holder of his holdings in the company and/or any salary or compensation if he did not
perform his duties satisfactorily" as demonstrating at-will employment. The appellate
court found this policy did not warrant Priebe's belief that he was employed for life by
the corporation.'I Although this court found a lawful breach of fiduciary duty by the
-*623 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio CL App.), jurisdictional motion overruled, 619 N.E.2d 1028 (Ohio 1993).
m Id. at 576. A motion to certify the record to the Supreme Court of Ohio was overruled. Priebe v. O'Malley, 619
N.E.2d 1028 (Ohio 1993).
LPriebe, 623 N.E.2d at 574. But in Pria be, the cororation had only recently been established in 1984 and Priebe





w'd. at 575 (quoting Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989)).
l Id. at 576. The appeals court noted Priebe's alleged reduction in sales, his inability to work well with others, as
well as some evidence that Priebe was convering corporate property to personal use, that he was not working full
shifts, and that he had threatened to close down the company. Id. at 575-76.
L* id.at576. The court cited to Mers as recognizing "that the cumulative effect of various events may transform an
employment-at-will agreement into an implied contract for a definite term." Id. Priebe was attempting to imply
lifetime employment from his 30 year involvement in building the business. Id.
1901d.
'16,d. (citing the strong presumptionin favor of at-wll-employmentnoted in Henkel v. Educational Research Council,
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corporation, it was unwilling to find this working minority shareholder anything other
than an at-will employee.16 3
B. The Expectations of Close Corporation Shareholders and an Implied Employment
Contract
In general, extending the requisite heightened fiduciary duty among close corpora-
tion shareholders to include termination of working shareholders only for cause emerges
from the shareholders' original expectations of their ownership in close corporations.'"
Shareholders of close corporations have different expectations than shareholders in
publicly held corporations. t" Shareholders of close corporations usually depend on
salaried managerial positions in order to realize an equal return on their investment in
the company.166 By drawing the partnership analogy to the close corporation structure,
the requisite duty of goodfaith and loyalty ofpartnerships would abolish at-will-employ-
ment among working shareholders.' 67 However, if term employment were achieved
merely because ofthe status of the shareholder, such a standard would be easily abused. 6'
The reasonable expectations test'69keeps such abuse in check. Without first determining
'Old.
'"See, eg., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657,662-63 (Mass. 1976) (holding that the termination
of a minority shareholder defeats the original objective c the shareholderin joining the corporation and prevents him
frin realizing an equal return on hisinvestment). Butsee Inglev. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311,1312-
13 (N.Y. 1989) (finding that a minority shareholder in a dose corporation is an at-will employee).
Id See Spratlin, supra note 14, at 408.
'"O'NEAL, spra note 13, § 7.15 at 525. O'Neal explains the underlying premise supporting the reasonable
expectations test:
[Tin a corporation based on a personal relationship a court should give relief, dissolution or some
other remedy, to a minority shareholder whenever corporate managers or controlling shareholders
act in a way that disappoints the minority shareholder's expectations, even though the acts of the
managers or controlling shareholders fall within the literal scope of powers or fights granted them
by the corporation act or the corporation's charter or by-laws.
Id. See generally Thompson, spra note 14.
See Victor Bmdney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICIL L REV. 259, 270
(1966) ("Strict fiduciary considerations would make any... legitimate business purpose irrelevant .. .
"See infra part ML C. and accompanying notes.
10The stiongest decision adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine held that-
These 'reasonable expectations' are to be ascertained by examining the entire history of the partici-
pants' relationship. That history will include the 'reasonable expectations' created at the inception
of the participants' relationship; those 'reasonable expectations' as altered over time; and the
'reasonable expectations' which develop as the participants engage in a course of dealing in con-
ducting the affairs of the corporation.... In order forplaintiff's expectations tobe reasonable, they
must be known to or assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by them. Privately held
expectations which are not made known to the other participants are not 'reasonable.' Only expec-
tations embodied in understandings, express or implied, among the participants should be rcog-
nized by the court.
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551,563 (N.C. 1983).
[Vol. 27:3,4
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the reasonable expectations of both the minority and the majority shareholders in a close
corporation, courts should hesitate to find employment relationships other than strictly
at-will.
17
Ohio's close corporation law merges with its employment law when determining
whether or not a terminated shareholder was unjustly discharged. The reasonable ex-
pectations of all the close corporation shareholders become the grounds by which the
court may find an implied contract for term employment17 1 Once the court finds an
implied contract for term employment embodied in the reasonable expectations of the
participants, then the court may proceed with the "balancing test" of Crosby and deter-
mine whetherthe discharge wasjustified."1 The initial step ofdetermining the existence
of an implied contract for term employment from the shareholders' reasonable expec-
tations achieves two purposes. First, it appropriately tempers the fiduciary duty required
of shareholdersinaclosecorporationsetting.'7 Second, it assures term employment will
not be found in close corporations without the parties first reasonably anticipating iL'74
The practical result of this two-step analysis will be that term employment in close
corporations will be found on a case-by-case basis when the reasonable expectations of
those involved demand it.175
A closer look at the courts' reasoning in two of Ohio's minority shareholder termi-
nation cases demonstrates how this two-step analysis should work, and how inconsis-
tencies result when it is not applied.
"aIn 1986, F. Hodge O'Neal called for some remedy at law for the terminated minority shareholder whose expec-
tations and investments have been exploited by the majority. See O'Neal, supra note 2, at 143. Today, Ohio courts
provide that remedy forthe oppressed minority shareholder who successfully meets the reasonable expectations tesL
Id.
" See Nicholson, supra note 2, at 532-33 (warning that if the use of the heightened fiduciary duty in settling
shareholderdisputes is not limited by eitherthe cours orthe legislatumre, minority shareholders will continue toneglect
to sat up provisions to resolve future conflicts when establishing their close corporation).
In See supra part LC. and accompanying notes. After the court finds an implied contract for term employment, then
the cor is free to balance any legitimate business purpose the majority had to discharge the shareholder against any
less harmful means of reaching the same purpose proposed by the minority. Id.
"See Kateasupra note 18, at 657-58; Spratlin, supra note 14,at 414-15; Thompson, supra note 14, at216. But see
Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1708 (asserting that any balancing inappropriately lessens the requisite parmership-type
fiduciary duty because it shifts the focus "from the classic fiduciary examination of whether the action taken was in
the beneficiary's best interests to a mode of analysis that centers on the fiduciary's interst.").
'-See Frank H. Easterrooit & Daniel R. Ftschel, Close Corporations andAgency Costs, 38 STAN. L REV. 271,293-
96 (1986) (concluding that the Wilkes balancing test limited the equal opportunity rule of Donahue by equating the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders to the implied terms of an employment contract).
" Under this analysis, a minority shareholder may still be legally discharged by the majority at any time and for any
reason if the participants did not expect term employment to result from their dealings. Without finding an implied
contract for employment, the majority need not show a legitimate business purpose for the discharge.
Winter/Sprting, 1994]
19
Kuhlman: Protection of Minority Stockholders
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
AKRON LAW REVIEW
InGigax and Priebe, both appellate courts cited toMers in analyzing whetherat-will
employment existed: 176
The facts and circumstances surrounding an oral employment-at-will agreement,
including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the
parties, company policy, or any other fact which may illuminate the question, can be
considered by the trier of fact in order to determine the agreement's explicit and implicit
terms concerning discharge.""
In Gigax the court considered the following factors in determining whether or not
the working shareholders were at-will-employees: (1) that the business involved was a
close corporation; (2) that those involved were both working directors and shareholders
of the close corporation; and (3) that those so involved were working without either an
employment contract or a shareholder's agreement pursuant to O.R.C. 1701.591.'7 In
Priebe, the court considered the following factors: (1) the recent re-formation of the
corporation to add a third shareholder to end prior deadlocks; (2) the newly formed
corporation's work policy permitting termination of working shareholders for unsatis-
factory performance; and (3) Priebe's lack of specific oral or written promise from the
company forlifetimeemployment.179 In the formercase, the court inferred term employ-
ment for the minority shareholder from the surrounding circumstances; 80 in the latter
case, the court would not infer a lifetime employment contract from the surrounding
factors, regardless of whether or not such employment was terminable for a legitimate
business purpose."" This resultant discrepancy stems from Priebe being a far less
sympathetic plaintiff who had supplied ample cause for his termination.lat What existed
in both of the above cases were minority shareholders who, by virtue of the reasonable
expectations of the corporate participants, had implied contracts forterm employment. 3
In these two cases, the first step of the analysis should have found neither Priebe nor
Gigax to be at-will-employees. However, by applying the second step of the analysis,
the courts could have effectuated the same holdings as actually reached. In the case of
I Gisax v. Repka, 615 N..2d 644,647-48 (Ohio CL App. 1992, Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E2d 573,576 (Ohio
C. App.),jurisdictionalmoion overruled, 619 N.E.2d 1028 (Ohio 1993).
"WMers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150,154 (Ohio 1985) (listing factors to consider that may overcome
the presumption of at-wtll-employmeit when the alleged permanent or lifetime employment is not accompanied by
additional consideration by the employee, over and above the satisfactory performance of his duties).
'm Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 648.
"'Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 576.
' See Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 648-49. In his concurrence, Judge Grady adds that he would also find term employment
from considerations made by Gigax in investing $70,000 and his work performance. 1d. at 650.
" Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 576.
veSee supra note 158.
1 Both plaintiffs had been involved with their fellow shareholders with reasonable expectations that their employ-
ment was part of the bargain and their retum on their investment.
[Vol. 77:3,4
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Gigax, the shareholder-majority did not fulfill its burden of showing a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for terminating the minority shareholder.18 In the case of Priebe, the
shareholder-majority did fulfill its burden)5 If Priebe could have then provided a less
harmful alternative that would have achieved the same purpose, his terminationmay still
have been prohibited.'"
Eliminating minority shareholders from employment opportunities and compensa-
tioninaclosecorporationprevents agreatportionofthe expected retumontheminority's
investment in the business.'" If when the shareholder joined the close corporation, she
had reasonable expectations that her salary would furnish a return, and when such
implied contractual terms are implicit in the nature and workings of the close corpora-
tion, courts should extend the Crosby requirement of a heightened fiduciary duty among
shareholders of close corporations"s to include finding an implied contract for term
employment for the working shareholders. 189 Lack of an employment agreement or
failure to take advantage of the protections available through the shareholders' agree-
ment of O.R.C. 1701.591 should not alter the original expectations of working minority
shareholders that their employment with their company was to last at least as long as the
corporation exists and their performance remained satisfactory. At the same time, be-
cause a legitimate business purpose may ultimately allow the termination of unproduc-
tive orunprofitable working shareholders, the corporation is also adequately protected.Y
1MGigax, 615 N.E.2d at 650.
lPriebe, 623 N.E. 2d at 575-76.
'"The case is devoid of any effort on Priebe's part to achieve this.
'9O'NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSIONOFMINoRrrY SHAR OLDERs, supra note 2, § 3:06at 37 (noting that close
corporations rarely pay dividends). See also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)
where the court notes:
The denial of employment to the minority at the hands of the majority is especially pernicious in
some instances. A guaranty of employment with the corporation may have been one of the basic
reason[s] why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm . .. The minority stockholder
typically depends on his salary as the principal return on his investment, since the earnings of a close
corporation... are distributed in major par in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits ... In sum,
by terminating a minority stockholder's employment orby severing him from a position as an officer
or director, the majority effectively frustrate the minority stockholder's purposes in entering on the
corporate venture and also deny him an equal retum on his investment.
Id. at 662-63.
'"Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217,221 (Ohio 1989) (holding that the heightened fiduciary duty is breached when
the majority uses their "control of the corporation to their own advantage, without providing minority shareholders
with an equal opportunity to benefit... "). See also Kates, supra note 18. at 657-59 (discussing the benefits of using
the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders as a guide to determining shareholder disputes).
'"See Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 648-49 (favorably quoting Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657
(Mass. 1976).
"'See id. at 650 (concluding "[olur holding today balances the need to protect the minority shareholder-employee
with the needs of the close corporation in ridding itself of the unproductive or troublesome employee."). The court
found that because all three shareholders' performance was down, and Gigax was not given notice of his alleged
decline in work quality, the majority had no legitimate business purpose to terminate Gigax. Id.
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Although the Ohio judiciary is reluctant to add a "just cause" and "good faith" require-
ment to the at-will-employment doctrine in general, it is mandated by the fiduciary duty
required when close corporations are analogized to partnerships. 1'
C. Argunents AgainstFinding Working Minority Shareholders to be Term Employees
Although the elimination of at-will-employment in close corporations is a natural
outgrowth of the heightened fiduciary duty owed by shareholders to each other, some
commentators have criticized such a shift in employment law.191 Their major arguments
center around the shortcomings of the partnership analogy to close corporations.' 91
Because Ohio has so whole-heartedly embraced this analogy,194 such arguments seem
inapplicable. However, other less explored arguments are worth noting.
First of all, there exists the possibility of creating minority rule through judicial
determinations based on fairness. The more power the minority has, the greater the
probability of shareholder disputes resulting in deadlock.'g9 If a 5% shareholder em-
ployed by the corporation may successfully litigate a wrongful termination suit, this
shareholder is in a position to exploit the majority as well as the corporation's profitabil-
ity."9 Suchexploitationmay financially destroy the business or, alternatively, guarantee
lifetime employment to the unproductive or uncooperative employee.'
The ultimate result of increasing the protection of working minority shareholders to
include a finding of term employment may be a reduction in offers of part-ownership in
19 See id. at 649-50.
m See Eastelbrook & Fischel, supra note 174, at 273 (proposing that shareholders of close corporations are open to
no moe exploitation than shareholders of publicly held corporations). See generally Sandra L Schlafge, Comment,
Pedro v. Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held Corporations and the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 76 MINN. L
REV. 1071 (1992) (arguing that employees of close corporations are not at-will-employees and are adequately
protected by statute in Minnesota without also granting wrongful tennination damages).
' See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fschel, supra note 174, at 297-300 (arguing that determining the employment contract
from the reasonable expectations and observable behavior of those involved in a close corporation achieves a better
result than a per se application of the partnership fiduciary duty); Kates, supra note 18, at 659-60 (proposing that
because by definition some close corporations may have up to fifty shareholders, the partnership analogy is weak-
ened); Nicholson, supra note 2, at 530-32 (arguing application of partnership law to close corporations may be
contrary to the objectives of the shareholders).
Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989). See also cases cited spra note 118.
"'In Ohio, deadlock is the only ground for dissolution of a close corporation. OH1O REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91
(AX4) (Baldwin 1992).
"'See Schlafge, supra note 192, at 1095 (suggesting that terminated minority shareholders who may recoup damages
through suits in tort for breach of fiduciary duty and wrongful termination, as well as be granted a fair buy-out price
for their stock, receive a judicial "windfall"). See also McLaughlin v. Beeghly, 617 N.E.2d 703,707 (Ohio CL App.
1992). The court found attorney fees recoverable in a shareholder suit for breach of fiduciary duty as in a derivative
suit. Id. This will provide further incentive to sue.
19' Schlafge, supra note 192, at 1095 & n. 119. The author also proposes that such an "easily abused standard" will
encourage such litigation whenever a working shareholder is fired without cause. Id. at 1094 & n. 118,1095 & n. 119.
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a business with limited personal liability.'" However, if future judicial determinations
are based on the reasonable expectations of the shareholders, close corporation disputes
will be settled according to the original explicit and implicit contract terms of the par-
ties.199 First determining the original expectations of the terminated employee will afford
the majority shareholders adequate protection against unjustifiable exploitation by the
minority shareholder."
Another problem created by the court's interpretation of term employment in close
corporations arises out of a perceived lessening in the requirements for discharging a
term employee. Conventional employment law requires a finding of "just cause" to
lawfully terminate an employee of definite term?.I The judicial interpretations in recent
Ohio case law are granting lawful terminations on a showing of a "legitimate business
purpose."2 If courts construe "a legitimate business purpose" to be less strict than the
requirement of "just cause," then term employees in close corporations may be dis-
charged for less significant reasons than other employees under contract in Ohio.
One final possible result from abolishing at-will-employment in close corporations
may be the further wearing down of the at-will doctrine in general.m A major criticism
of the conventional at-will doctrine is that it fails to reflect the reasonable expectations
'"See Easterbrook& Fischel,supra note 174, at 290 (recommending the benefits of protecting minority shareholders
should be weighed against 'greater transaction costs as deadlocks multiply, an increase in the price of equity and debt
capital, and perhaps the denial of any oppotunity to invest.").
L"See Thompson, supranote 14, at 225 (suggesting that oppression statutes like MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West
1985) guarantee that the reasonable expectations of all involved would determine what protections are afforded the
disputing factions). But see, Schlafge,supra note 192, at 1094-97 (arguingjudicial use of the reasonable expectations
standard in Minnesota which results in finding shareholders term employees is unwarranted because of Minnesota's
statutory protections).
2' See Eastebrook & Flschel, supra note 174, at 296. The commentators compare the balancing test of Wilkes to the
standard of review used to determine "conflict of interest transactions in publicly held corporations. This standard,
which gives some but not absolute protection to the minority, is in all likelihood closer to the bargain the parties would
have reached themselves if transaction costs were zero." Id.
3mThe draft Uniform Employment-TenninationAct of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws defines a good cause as: "(I) a reasonable basis for termination in view of relevant factors and circumstances,
*z (2) the exercise of good-faith business judgment by the employer." UNIV. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
(Draft Mar. 11, 1990). Specific examples given under the first option include employee theft, on-the-job drug or
alcohol use, inadequate job performance and neglect of duty. Id. But see Men v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d
150,153 (Ohio 1985) (warning against abolishing at-will-employment because it would result in continuous judicial
second guessing as to the employers' business judgment).
I See, e.g., Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E.2d 573,575 (Ohio CL App.),jurivdictionamotion overruled, 619 N.E.2d
1028 (Ohio 1993). See also supra note 158 (for examples cited by court of sufficient corporate business purpose for
terminating the employee); Wrightsel v. Ross-Co Redi-Mix, Inc., No. 1791,1993 WL 97780 at *6 (Ohio CL App.
41h Dist. Mar. 26,1993) (upholding lower court holding in favor of terminated employee when discharging share-
holders offered no legitimate business purpose for the ternination).
= Schlafge, supra note 192, at 1094-95.
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of modem employees and employers. Recent Ohio case law bases the finding of term
employment, where an employee is also a shareholder of a close corporation, on the
reasonable expectations of the shareholder.' It may only be a small jump to extend this
holding to include the reasonable expectations of all of today's employees for job secu-
rity and all of today's employers for lower costs from reduced employee turnover rates.
CONCLUSION
Ohio courts are responding to the special needs of shareholders in close corpora-
tions. This is necessitated by the optional character of Ohio's close corporation law. By
no longer viewing working shareholders as at-will-employees, the courts have carved
out a new exception to at-will-employment in Ohio. This exception is a natural out-
growth of current close corporation law. However, the court system must insure a just
result by first determining the reasonable expectations of the shareholders when creating
the implied-in-fact employment contract. In thismanner, a workable balance is achieved
where the majority is protected from unwarranted exploitation by the minority, while the
special nature of the minority is more adequately shielded.
KATHLEEN L. KUHLMAN
201 See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employnent Termination, 66 N.C. L. REv. 631,674-75 (1988);
St. Antoine, supra note 50, at 66-71 (reviewing the basis for the presumption of at-will-employment and calling for
statutory solutions in response to legitimate employee expectations); Cavico, supra note 43, at 502 (quoting Sabine
Pilot Serv. v. Hauch, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring)).
Absolute employment-at-will is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up visions of the sweat
shops described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. This doctrine belongs in a museum,
not in our law. As it was a judicially promulgated doctrine, this court has the burden and duty of
amending it to reflect social and economic changes.
Id.
2See supra part I. B. and accompanying notes.
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